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NEW CHALLENGES TO TRANSBOUNDARY UNITIZATION IN THE 
GULF OF MEXICO 
 




In the last two decades, the search for untapped oil reserves led to 
many innovations in oil and gas exploration. As new technology 
continues to open new horizons, oil companies are increasingly able 
to drill at deeper ocean depths to tap offshore reserves. Offshore 
drilling poses problems where oil reserves hundreds of miles from 
shore cross an international boundary line. While American courts 
typically apply the rule of capture to determine who owns the subsoil 
resources, international law requires countries to work together to 
maximize the efficient, safe extraction of the resources. In 2012, the 
United States and Mexico drafted a treaty that would govern the 
unitization of an offshore transboundary oil field. Today, Mexico’s 
energy laws are very different. A new administration threatens to 
unravel recent liberal reforms, and the United States has become more 
hostile to Chinese investment in the region. With these political 
challenges in mind, the treaty is very vague on critical issues, 
particularly its dispute resolution clause, which the United States and 
Mexico must strengthen if the treaty is to be effective and shared 
transboundary resources develop efficiently to the benefit of both 
nations. The treaty creates a body called the Joint Commission to 
create much of the treaty’s policy and procedure. In order to maintain 
good relations and a healthy energy sector, the Joint Commission 
needs to create subsidiary committees subject to its control and 
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Et quidem naturali iure communia sunt omnium haec: aer et aqua 




Roman law regarded the sea as the property of all mankind for all 
to pass through uninhibited according to Natural Law.2 Disputes over 
trade, the Declaration of Pope Alexander, and Portuguese claims to 
sovereignty over maritime trade routes led Hugo Grotius to argue from 
Natural Law that it is impossible to make the sea property, and 
therefore it should be shared by all nations.3 However, by the early 
modern era, coastal states asserted territorial sovereignty over three 
miles from the shore—because this is how far the average cannonball 
from a sea-fort would reach.4 This projection of force was the only 
 
 1. J. INST. 2.1.1. (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans., Cornell Univ. Press 4th 
prtg. 1996) (“The things which are naturally everybody’s are: air, flowing water, the 
sea, and the sea-shore.”). 
 2. William T. Abel, Fishing for an International Norm to Govern Straddling 
Stocks: The Canada-Spain Dispute of 1995, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 553, 
556 (1996). 
3.HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIERUM 47 (Ralph van Deman Magoffin trans., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1916) (1608) (“For it is impossible to acquire by usucaption or 
prescription things which cannot become property, that is, which are not susceptible 
of possession or of quasi-possession, and which cannot be alienated. All of which is 
true with respect to the sea and its use.”), available at 
https://books.google.com/books/about/Mare_liberum.html?id=7SkRAAAAYAAJ
&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
 4. ERNEST E. SMITH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS 106 
(3d ed. 2010). 
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way to assert dominion over the waters, and thus the sea was regarded 
as common property.  
As the technology to extract more resources from the world’s 
oceans developed in the 20th century, states began to claim more 
sovereignty over the oceans to preserve their interest in subsoil 
resources.5 In 1945, President Truman, through federal proclamation, 
claimed the exclusive federal right to all subsoil resources of the 
continental shelf adjacent to the territorial sea.6 Not wanting to be left 
out, coastal nations began to claim the continental shelf and all 
resources therein, leading to maritime boundary disputes the 
International Community had to settle throughout subsequent 
decades.7 
Today, nations with an ocean coastline have different levels of legal 
jurisdictions within their sovereignty.8 Most legal authority 
establishing the law of the sea comes from the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).9 Ratified by most 
nations, the United States never ratified the convention but has 
recognized most of it as customary international law.10 The convention 
established jurisdictions including a twelve-mile territorial sea, 
twenty-four miles of contiguous sea, the 200-mile Exclusive 
Economic Zone (“EEZ”), and the Continental Shelf.11 The modern 
law of the sea gives all nations the freedom to travel the high seas, 
including the territorial sea but reserves different rights to ocean and 
seabed resources in different regions.12  
Under UNCLOS, states have sovereign rights to all resources in the 
200 mile EEZ, including subsoil resources.13 Where the continental 
shelf extends past the EEZ, States can claim up to 350 miles, 
depending on geological features, and assert sovereignty over subsoil 
resources in this zone.14 UNCLOS leaves the limitation of boundaries 
 
 5. Id. at 106–07. 
 6. Id. at 107 (quoting Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Oct. 2, 
1945)). 
 7. Md. Monjour Hasan et al., Protracted Maritime Boundary Disputes and 
Maritime Laws, 2 J. INT’L MAR. SAFETY, ENVTL. AFF., & SHIPPING 89, 89 (2018). 
 8. Richard J. McLaughlin & Kateryna M. Wowk, Managing Areas Beyond 
National Jurisdiction in the Gulf of Mexico: Current and Developing International 
Legal Authority and Future Challenges, 9.2 SEA GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 16, 20 (2018). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Henry Jones, Lines in the Ocean: Thinking with the Sea About Territory and 
International Law, 4 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 307, 334–35 (2016). 
 13. McLaughlin & Wowk, supra note 9, at 21. 
 14. Id. 
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on the continental shelf up to the coastal nations themselves.15 Many 
of these maritime borders are still contested with sovereigns unable to 
agree on many maritime boundaries for various legal, geographical, 
and geopolitical reasons.16 The United States and Mexico delineated 
the boundary of the Western half of the Gulf of Mexico (“GOM”) in a 
2000 treaty.17  
Oil is a fugitive resource—it flows like water under the ground and 
lies pooled in rocks where Nature or Nature’s God has deposited it 
irrespective of the boundaries mankind places on the surface of the 
earth. This can be especially problematic when drilling in deepwater—
deeper than 4,000 feet—or ultra-deepwater—deeper than 7,000 feet 
because of the high cost of drilling at such depths.18 The United States 
has generally applied the rule of capture to oil and gas production on 
land. The rule of capture states that regardless of whose land the oil 
reservoir may also be under, the first in time to drill and extract the oil 
owns the oil.19 Thus, on land, it is perfectly legal to extract oil that lies 
under someone else’s property lines because the first in time to drill 
can legally siphon off the oil from the pool.20  
Few other nations follow the rule of capture on land and have 
favored a legal process called “unitization” for offshore oil and gas 
reservoirs, which lay on both sides of a maritime boundary.21 
Unitization is a standard method sovereigns use to efficiently share 
offshore resources.22 Unitization is the process of treating the reservoir 
as one unit, as if owned and operated by a single entity, to facilitate 
the most efficient means of extraction.23 The unitization of a 
transboundary reservoir usually requires a treaty between the nations 
 
 15. Id. at 35. 
 16. For a list of main disputed areas, see Nicholas Newman, Maritime Boundary 
Disputes, ENIDAY https://www.eniday.com/en/human_en/maritime-boundary-
disputes/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).  
 17. Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez & Richard J. McLaughlin, The 2012 Agreement 
on the Exploitation of Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resources in the Gulf of 
Mexico: Confirmation of the Rule or Emergence of a New Practice?, 37 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 681, 740 (2015). 
 18. Jason Lavis, Shallow, mid to ultra deepwater definitions, DRILLERS (Apr. 6, 
2018) https://drillers.com/shallow-mid-to-ultra-deepwater-definitions/. 
 19. Youri van Logchem, The Status of a Rule of Capture under International 
Law of the Sea with Regard to Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Related Activities, 26 
MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 195, 201 (2018). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 217.   
 22. Id. at 218–219. 
 23. SMITH ET AL., supra note 4, at 167. 
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the reservoir crosses so that the nations can govern the unitized area 
with one legal, tax, regulatory, and production scheme.24 
Unitization is not uncommon in offshore oil and gas production 
because the square leasing blocks are imposed over the ocean. The 
United States and Mexico divide the GOM into square blocks for 
leasing to companies who explore for oil and gas reserves.25 However, 
subsoil reservoirs never conform to the blocks with geometric 
precision and can cross the blocks within one country’s jurisdiction.  
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE 2012 TREATY 
A. Mexico’s Pre-Reform Hydrocarbon Regime 
In 1938, Mexico was the first country to nationalize the entire oil 
and gas sector.26 Before President Lázaro Cárdenas expropriated all 
foreign assets, the Mexican Constitution of 1917 had already reserved 
the ownership of subsoil hydrocarbons to the government.27 The 
International Oil Companies (“IOCs”) issued an embargo against 
Mexican oil in the international market, forcing Mexico to sell its oil 
to Nazi Germany.28 While some United States officials urged dealing 
harshly with Mexico, President Roosevelt found it more important to 
maintain a good relationship with Mexico to prevent a possible 
alliance with the Axis Powers.29 Eventually, the Mexican Government 
compensated several American IOCs for the expropriations, but 
Mexico’s state-owned oil company, Petróleos Mexicanos 
(“PEMEX”), retained its monopoly. 
Eventually, PEMEX could not conduct the exploration needed to 
continue producing oil at sustainable rates.30 The Mexican 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. For leases on the US side of the gulf, see Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management Gulf of Mexico Protraction Finder, 
http://www.arcgis.com/apps/View/index.html?appid=a20b30b37ae147a59afac8a8
4a2d4052&extent=-99.8775,22.3323,-78.7838,32.3452. Note the green lease 
squares abutting the maritime border in the “Alaminos Canyon” leasing region. For 
the Mexican side, see https://portal.cnih.cnh.gob.mx/iicnih2/. 
 26. Office of the Historian, Mexican Expropriation of Foreign Oil, 1938, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/mexican-oil (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2019). 
 27. Richard H.K. Vietor & Haviland Sheldahl-Thomason, Mexico’s Energy 
Reform, HARV. BUS. SCH. CASE 717-027, January 2017. (Revised August 2017.) 1.. 
 28. Office of the Historian, Mexican Expropriation of Foreign Oil, 1938, U.S. 
DEP’T OF ST. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/mexican-oil (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2019). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 684. 
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Government utilized PEMEX’s profits through heavy taxes and 
provided about one-third of the government’s income by taxing its 
income at 69%.31 By 2015, production in the once massive Cantarell 
field had fallen by 80%, labor unions were extracting hefty profits, and 
PEMEX continued to maximize the volume of oil produced instead of 
the number of wells, leaving PEMEX short of cash to explore for new 
fields.32 
Meanwhile, IOCs developed the technology for extracting oil from 
ultra-deepwater reservoirs. As they expanded deeper into the Gulf of 
Mexico, the Mexican government grew concerned about a reservoir 
straddling both borders siphoning off oil from Mexican Territory, 
prompting national debate and pressure to create a treaty with the 
United States.33 Mexico’s hydrocarbon law gave PEMEX exclusive 
rights to explore and produce oil, yet PEMEX lacked the resources 
and technology to exploit these deepwater reservoirs because their 
profits were funding government revenue instead of reinvesting in 
exploration and production.34 PEMEX’s favored position posed a 
unique problem because they could neither legally nor financially 
undertake a joint venture in these ultra-deepwater fields. Additionally, 
PEMEX’s oil production declined, compounding the problem and 
making the need for unconventional and deepwater exploration even 
more vital for Mexico’s oil and gas industry to sustain itself.35 
In 2012, United States and Mexican officials met to plan for 
deepwater exploration’s expansion into the transboundary region of 
the GOM. The 2012 treaty they created was designed to work around 
the PEMEX monopoly while maintaining sovereignty over natural 
resources.36  However, the United States failed to ratify it for nearly 
two years because it was caught up in political controversy.37 By 2014, 
once it became clear that Mexico would pass energy reforms 
 
 31. Vietor & Sheldahl-Thomason, supra note 28, at 2. 
 32. Id. at 3. 
 33. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18 at 686, 689–690. 
 34. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, art. 27, para. 1, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 1967; Javier Martínez-Romero, Ph.D., 
Innovation as an Imperative for the Mexican Oil Industry Post Energy Reform, 
JAMES A. BAKER III INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y, April 2017, at 1, 2. 
 35. Sanchez & Mclaughlin, supra note 18 at 684. 
 36. Id. at 791. 
 37. At the time there were tensions with IOC’s because of some Dodd-Frank 
restrictions, see SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, 112TH CONG., OIL, MEXICO, AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY AGREEMENT 
9, 15 (S. Print 2012); Sanchez & Mclaughlin, supra note 17 at 751. 
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liberalizing the oil monopoly by a complex constitutional amendment, 
the United States Senate ratified the treaty.38  
The United States recognized that the trend in Mexico’s 
hydrocarbon regime was towards reform, yet was skeptical of the 
stability of the transition.39 The United States was chiefly concerned 
with supporting anything that promoted IOC’s willingness to invest in 
Mexican oil as the industry opened up.40 Economically, the United 
States recognized that Mexico supports United States energy security 
by being a reliable and friendly producer of oil in the region.41 
Geopolitically, strengthening Mexico’s hydrocarbon sector was 
important because unconventional resources in the United States and 
Canada as well as Mexico’s untapped reserves were an important 
energy security issue.42 The United States Senate saw these new North 
American oil resources as a way to undermine the power of hostile 
authoritarian regimes reliant on hydrocarbons for funding, like 
Venezuela and Russia.43 The treaty incorporates these reasons but 
overall was meant to reduce legal uncertainty in the transboundary 
region to encourage IOC investment. 
The 2012 treaty establishes a procedure for any exploration within 
three miles of the maritime boundary in the GOM.44 It requires 
licensees on either side to share geological information in this area 
annually and to provide written notice within sixty days of becoming 
aware of the “likely existence” of a transboundary reservoir.45 Once 
triggered, the parties have thirty days to initiate an investigation, and 
if the parties cannot determine whether a transboundary reservoir 
exists within sixty days, they must alert the Joint Commission.46 The 
Joint Commission is created by the United States and Mexico, 
consisting of one representative (and one alternate representative) 
from each party, chosen by the Executive Agency of each party.47 The 
Joint Commission is supposed to examine disputes, interpret the 
 
 38. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 748. 
 39. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 38, at 2–3. 
 40. Id. at 6. 
 41. Id. at 11. 
 42. Id. at 12–13. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Agreement between the United States of America and the United Mexican 
States Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs 
in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S.-Mex., art. 4 §1, Feb. 20, 2012, T.I.A.S. 14-0718 
(hereinafter “2012 Transboundary Treaty”). 
 45. Id. at art 4. §2(a), (c). 
 46. Id. at art. 5 §§ 1–2. 
 47. Id. at art. 14 §2.  
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treaty, implement terms, and set rules of procedure.48 The Joint 
Commission may submit disputes, such as the existence of a 
transboundary reservoir, to an expert determination; initiate dispute 
resolution clause; or send the matter to non-binding mediation or 
arbitration.49 The Joint Commission must also establish the rules and 
procedure of arbitration.50 
B. Ratification and Energy Reform 
1. Relevance of the Treaty Post-Reform 
Deepwater and ultra-deepwater oil production is incredibly costly. 
The United States Energy Information Agency estimated that one 
deepwater project by Chevron in the GOM took nine years to go from 
discovery to production and cost $91 million per well, including a 
$258 million pipeline.51 It takes an average of five drilling attempts 
before finding an economically productive hydrocarbon reserve.52 Oil 
companies want national offshore boundaries negotiated in a way that 
minimizes their investment risk because of the extremely high capital 
costs.  
Mexico and the United States negotiated the 2012 treaty before 
Mexico’s historic energy reforms when a joint venture was not legal.53 
Since then, Mexico has granted licenses to foreign investors for 
deepwater exploration, creating unique complications for 
implementing the treaty. When the United States and Mexico ratified 
the treaty, IOCs in the United States side were already producing 
within the three-mile zone, meaning the oil reservoir could straddle 
the boundary.54 However, the United States exempted itself from 
retroactive enforcement of these wells in the treaty.55 Many of these 
operators were not grandfathered into the treaty, as the United States 
 
 48. Id. at art. 14 §§ 4–5. 
 49. Id. at art. 14 §8. 
 50. Id. at art. 17. 
 51. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Trends in U.S. Oil and Natural 
Gas Upstream Costs 108–109, US DEP’T OF ENERGY (Mar. 2016), 
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/drilling/pdf/upstream.pdf. 
 52. Will Kenton, Exploratory Well, INVESTOPEDIA 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/exploratory-well.asp (last updated June 25, 
2019). 
 53. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 748. 
 54. Id. at 740. 
 55. Id. at 746–47. 
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did not force their licensees to modify their contracts to conform with 
the 2012 treaty.56 
For example, the Perdido fold belt is a long geologic feature in the 
GOM consisting of a series of subterranean anticline formations 
found to contain oil on both sides of the maritime border.57 In the 
Perdido region, IOCs are already producing within a few miles of the 
maritime border, while Mexico has awarded an exploration license to 
a Chinese government owned company on their side of the GOM.58 It 
is possible that some of the wells on the United States side in Perdido 
straddle transboundary reserves, yet the licensees are under no treaty 
obligation to determine the boundaries.59 To date, neither side has 
attempted to determine whether a transboundary reservoir exists, 
which would trigger the treaty’s implementation.  
If the licensee that discovers a transboundary reservoir in their 
concession is a National Oil Company (“NOC”) like Sinopec or the 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (“CNOOC”), it would 
essentially invite a third government into the unitization 
negotiations.60 The government involved would learn a great deal 
about effectively negotiating transboundary contracts. Additionally, 
United States foreign policy has recently been more suspicious of 
Chinese investment in the United States’ immediate sphere of 
influence.61 
The 2013 reforms have allowed private companies to make joint 
production, profit sharing, licenses, and service contracts.62 However, 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Javier H. Estrada, Reservoirs that Cross Country Lines Need Special 
Agreements, OFFSHORE MAG. (July 1, 2009), https://www.offshore-
mag.com/articles/print/volume-69/issue-7/latin-america/reservoirs-that-cross.html. 
 58. Kristy Hays, UPDATE 1-Shell Starts Production at Perdido, REUTERS (Mar. 
31, 2010, 5:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/shell-perdido/update-1-shell-
starts-production-at-perdido-idUSN3123683920100331; Shell Picks Up Nine 
Blocks in Mexico Offshore Lease Round, MAR. EXECUTIVE ( Jan. 31, 2018, 7:44 
PM), https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/shell-picks-up-nine-blocks-in-
mexico-offshore-lease-round; Matt Zborowski, BHP, CNOOC, European Majors 
Among Winners for Mexican Deepwater Blocks, OIL & GAS J. (Dec. 5, 2016), 
https://www.ogj.com/articles/2016/12/bhp-cnooc-european-majors-among-
winners-for-mexican-deepwater-blocks.html. 
 59. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 685. 
 60. See generally Jilles van den Beukel, Chinese National Oil Companies: 
Giants Built on Shaky Foundations, ENERGYPOST (Sept. 26, 2016), 
https://energypost.eu/chinese-national-oil-companies-giants-built-shaky-
foundations/. 
 61. See Robert D. Kaplan, A New Cold War Has Begun, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 7, 
2019, 6:27 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/a-new-cold-war-has-begun/. 
 62. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 758. 
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transboundary fields require at least 20% participation with PEMEX, 
which further complicates negotiating the terms in a unitization 
agreement.63 In light of the Mexican energy reforms and foreign 
investment, it is unclear how relevant the treaty remains. If it is not 
relevant, it is still a binding treaty. In either case, states must clarify 
certain ambiguities in the treaty language for it to accomplish its goals 
effectively. 
2. Ambiguities and Their Political Impact 
The 2012 treaty requires the United States and Mexico to share all 
information obtained during exploration within three miles of the 
delimitation line.64 It requires a party aware of “the likely existence” 
of a transboundary reservoir to provide written notice and share 
seismic data.65 International law generally requires a standard of good 
faith to interpret treaty language which is necessarily vague, such as 
“likely existence.”66 The interpretation could be complicated when 
the parties of the treaty are two sovereign nations and the licensees 
exploring for oil reservoirs are IOCs and foreign state-owned 
companies.  
The capital risks and the high cost of obtaining reliable seismic data 
provide some incentive to interpret the data in a way that shows 
transboundary reservoirs do not exist. On the other hand, for Mexico, 
which lacks infrastructure, investment, and capital, there is an 
incentive to interpret seismic date liberally to provide for a 
transboundary reservoir. Some voices in Mexican politics believe that 
oil companies on the United States side of the maritime border are 
extracting from transboundary reservoirs, but this is not confirmed.67  
No language specifies when economic efficiency should yield to 
environmental concerns or State interests.68 The United States Senate, 
while urging the treaty’s ratification, tacitly acknowledged that the 
“plain language” failed to improve environmental safety standards 
and could even lower existing standards.69 The Senate committee was 
concerned that this would result in lower standards by delegating 
 
 63. Id. at 759.  
 64. 2012 Transboundary Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 4, § 1. 
 65. Id. at art. 4, § 2(a)–(b). 
 66. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 336; 2012 Transboundary Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 4, § 2. 
 67. Sanchez & Mclaughlin, supra note 18 at 686. 
 68. Id. at 753. 
 69. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 38, at 9–10. 
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authority to the appropriate executive appointee to define the 
standards.70 Environmental safety standards became increasingly 
important after the high profile oil spill by British Petroleum in 
2010.71  
The ambiguities in the treaty are problematic because Mexico 
considers these resources property of the State for the benefit of the 
nation, while the United States sees oil production as a national 
security issue, necessitating that private companies exploit the 
resources efficiently.72 These interests are not directly in conflict, but 
different situations could lead the parties to desire different outcomes. 
Mexico’s nationalistic approach makes them less willing to see 
profits flow out of Mexico, while the United States’s view of oil as a 
national security issue desires resource development that stabilizes 
the Mexican nation and economy concerning their place in the global 
marketplace.  
In the United States view, foreign investment in Mexico’s energy 
sector contributes to political stability in Mexico. Political instability 
leading to upheaval or investment by hostile foreign powers are 
important concerns. Chinese NOC investment in Mexican offshore 
oil potentially allows Chinese geopolitical influence in the Gulf of 
Mexico and may lead the United States to be less charitable in 
negotiating a unitization contract.73 The United States is pressuring 
nations in Central America to avoid business ties with Chinese state-
owned corporations.74 The United States’s economic tensions with 
Chinese investors could easily lead to a dispute about the terms of 
unitization while implementing the treaty. 
 
 70. Specifically, the Secretary of the Interior, Id. at 10. 
 71. Terese Collins, The Gulf Oil Spill, SMITHSONIAN (April 2018), 
https://ocean.si.edu/conservation/pollution/gulf-oil-spill. 
 72. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 754. 
 73. Compare to Chinese investment in Venezuela and the US response, Antonio 
C. Hsiang, China and the Venezuela Crisis, DIPLOMAT (July 24, 2017), 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/china-and-the-venezuela-crisis/. For a more 
detailed look at Chinese investment in Venezuela in the context of Chinese 
geopolitical ambitions, with a recommendation for a hard stance from the US, see 
Moises Rendon, When Investment Hurts: Chinese Influence in Venezuela, CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (April 3, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/when-
investment-hurts-chinese-influence-venezuela 
 74. Edward Wong, Mike Pompeo Warns Panama Against Doing Business With 
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III.  POTENTIAL DISPUTES & RESOLUTION 
A. The Rule of Capture and International Law 
Mexico’s concern is that if a United States licensee invokes the rule 
of capture in a transboundary reservoir, it will effectively steal 
resources the government owns, and they will lose profits and rents 
they deserve. International law generally rejects the rule of capture in 
favor of good faith requirements of dealing between sovereigns.75 
Additionally, most governments agree that applying the rule of capture 
is not in their best interest, as it leads to competitive drilling, 
inaccessible resources, and inefficiency.76 Avoiding competitive 
drilling is a significant state goal when negotiating transboundary 
agreements because both sides typically lose by not extracting the oil 
as efficiently.77 Oil and gas reserves are fugitive resources that will 
travel from their location to the well or place of extraction.78 Several 
nations have reached agreements for joint development or unitization 
that reject the rule of capture and this possibly establishes a rejection 
of the rule of capture according to customary international law.79  
In addition to customary international law, UNCLOS articles 74(3), 
84(3), and two United Nations Assembly Resolutions also support the 
position that cooperative development of offshore transboundary 
reserves is the international standard.80 Supporting the theory that 
international law bars competitive drilling, the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) decided that states are obliged to behave as good 
neighbors (sic utere tuo, ut alienum non leaedas) as a rule of 
customary international law.81 However, these laws are not definitive, 
and a dispute over transboundary reserves is what Saddam Hussein 
alleged justified his invasion of Kuwait.82 Applied to oil and gas 
reserves, the rule of capture would cause a loss of these resources to 
one nation, and such an action by one state against another state’s 
claims and sovereign rights is likely to cause an international 
confrontation.83 
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However, even before the treaty, some scholars pointed out the 
inevitability of an operator applying the rule of capture. Professor 
Grunstein highlighted that if a licensee who has invested 500 million 
dollars in exploration discovers a transboundary reservoir, they are not 
going to stop production while the United States and Mexico negotiate 
the unitization details according to the treaty.84 Additionally, some 
states have taken actions that seem to invoke the rule of capture over 
subsoil resources in a disputed maritime border. Ghana caused an 
international incident when Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire were waiting for 
a ruling over a disputed maritime area, and Ghana began moving 
infrastructure as if they were still planning on producing the 
resources.85 Arguably, exploration activity, like seismic surveys and 
exploratory wells in a disputed area, can violate the international law 
principle against aggravating a dispute.86 Commencing drilling in a 
transboundary region comes with serious consequences and is based 
on dubious legal grounds.  
PEMEX is supposed to participate in any offshore transboundary 
reservoirs, but it could take years before PEMEX has the resources to 
contribute more than cash to deepwater hydrocarbon production.87 
IOCs will be less likely to explore for oil in the area if there is a chance 
they have to delay production so that the United States and Mexico 
can figure out how to incorporate PEMEX into their unitization 
agreement. Several scholars proposed to solve this problem by putting 
the proportion of funds due to Mexico into an escrow fund until the 
treaty details have been sorted out.88 University of Dundee Professor 
Peter Cameron first advocated this approach as a solution that would 
allow drilling to continue promptly without invoking the rule of 
capture.89  
This approach could lead to drilling before the licensees find the 
best spot to drill, and customary international law on this topic remains 
scarce.90 However, it resolves many problems by preventing a halt of 
production while the treaty details are sorted out. Escrow would be a 
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fairer option for the governments on both sides, while the licensees 
will likely object because they potentially lose opportunity costs when 
oil profits are locked in escrow instead of in their cash flow while 
various parties debate unitization. Once again, the problem comes 
from the parties’ misaligned interests. The United States and Mexico 
want to ensure they are not losing out on natural resource revenue over 
time, while an IOC that has invested 500 million dollars over the better 
part of a decade wants to start seeing a return on their investment. As 
the interests of United States and Mexico are greater than IOC 
revenue, IOC cash flows will probably need to temporarily yield to 
soveriegn perogatives by sending profits into escrow in order to 
preserve peace and allow production to continue.  
The escrow solution, while applying international law principles of 
equity, good faith, and fair dealing, is complicated in several 
situations. Because of the complexities of determining whether a 
transboundary field exists, wells may already be producing from 
transboundary fields.91 The United States awards blocks to oil 
companies for exploration in the GOM roughly nine square miles in 
size.92 The Neptune Field, a deepwater field 120 miles from Louisiana, 
spans five of these nine square mile blocks.93 Thus, it is entirely 
possible that there are unknown deepwater and ultra-deepwater 
reservoirs that lessees may discover outside the three-mile reporting 
zone required by the treaty, which could still cross the boundary.94 If 
a licensee discovers a transboundary reservoir, and the American side 
has been producing for several years already, the escrow option will 
probably be reasonable to apply, but the treaty does not explicitly 
provide for the contingency, making the transaction ripe for conflict. 
B. Points of Contention 
Of course, no parties plan on an unresolvable dispute while 
negotiating unitization. The 2012 treaty leaves dispute resolution 
fairly vague, establishing expert determination, non-binding 
mediation, and arbitration in different situations.95 The Joint 
Commission is supposed to establish the procedure and mechanism 
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for arbitration.96 The Joint Commission consists of two members (and 
two alternates) appointed by each nation’s executive agency.97 Two 
political appointees are unlikely able to create a satisfactory arbitration 
regime for a high-stakes international business deal like a unitization 
agreement. Transboundary unitization contracts are incredibly 
complex, multiplying the opportunity for disputes to arise. 
A significant point of contention could conceivably be designating 
the unit operator. The 2012 treaty states that the Executive Agencies 
will pick the unit operator “by agreement between the licensees.”98 
Designating the unit operator could become extremely complicated. 
For example, suppose a Chinese licensee on the Mexican side 
discovers they have been unknowingly producing from a 
transboundary reservoir for several years and two different IOCs were 
producing from the same reservoir on the United States side. In a joint 
operating agreement, the operator is usually the party with the greatest 
interest in the venture.99 Mexico requires offshore licensees to accept 
PEMEX’s participation in an agreement by at least 20%,100 adding 
fourth potential operator. Mexico may want their Chinese licensee to 
be operator because of their view of oil as a national asset, even though 
the IOCs clearly had a greater interest. The Joint Commission would 
send proportionality and other issues to expert determination while 
negotiating the unitization agreement.101 The Joint Commission could 
handle these contingencies if it could be strengthened to provide 
expertise and transparency to ensure adaptability.  
IV.  FUTURE CONCERNS 
A. Strengthening the Joint Commission 
The treaty ultimately needs amendment or revision now that 
Mexico has opened to private investment. The parties could either 
completely terminate the treaty or amend it. Termination merely 
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requires 180 days’ notice by either party.102 It can be amended at any 
time by mutual written agreement.103 In either case, the cumbersome 
legislative process of the United States Senate providing its advice and 
consent could take even longer to ratify the new treaty or 
amendments.104 As of 2018, seven treaty amendments were pending 
in the United States Senate, the earliest introduced in 1983.105 The oil 
companies who bear the financial risk want the procedure as clear as 
possible to ensure they can see a return on their investment. The best 
option is probably to utilize the broad, vague language in the treaty by 
strengthening the Joint Commission into a body competent to establish 
an efficient procedure and make good decisions. 
To do this, the Joint Commission should establish one or more 
subsidiary committees of experts to create the policy and procedure, 
whose decisions will only become binding once ratified by the Joint 
Commission. This way the Joint Commission can have the expertise 
of more impartial industry experts rather than mere political 
appointees but still maintain state sovereignty because the two Joint 
Commission members would retain ultimate veto power.  
From a geopolitical standpoint, the United States wants Mexico’s 
offshore resources developed, mainly by IOC capital and expertise, 
more than it cares about extracting rents in the transboundary 
region.106 Because the Mexican Government gets 20% of its revenue 
from oil production, it produces stability in the region to the benefit of 
the United States the more Mexico’s oil reserves are efficiently 
exploited.107 A productive Mexican oil and gas sector will contribute 
to political and social stability because the government will be well-
funded and can maintain its extensive entitlement programs without 
angering the powerful labor unions. Additionally, the energy sectors 
of both countries are highly intertwined. In 2017, although the United 
States imported more crude oil from Mexico than it exported to 
Mexico, United States oil exports to Mexico accounted for over 50% 
of Mexico’s gasoline use.108 It is thus in the interests of both countries, 
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one as a net importer and the other as a net exporter, to resolve disputes 
in oil production promptly.109 The treaty is not especially helpful in 
this case because specific procedure and terms have been left up to the 
future Joint Commission to decide.110  
Because difficulties can easily arise, both states are put in a position 
to leverage an imbalance in the unitization agreement or production 
terms near the three-mile area in the event of a dispute. Once an oil or 
gas reserve is found, it takes about ten years before production 
begins.111 Because standard practice is on such a long timeframe, IOCs 
are hemorrhaging money during exploration and drilling and want 
legal issues like unitization resolved with certain promptness. 
Additionally, the transboundary region has the potential to quickly 
become very politicized, as it has been in Mexico.112 These critical 
political and financial concerns necessitate effective treaty 
implementation so that unitization occurs smoothly and equitably. 
However, the treaty’s vague terms only put an obligation on both 
governments to attempt to negotiate, while leaving many of the 
decisions to the Joint Commission. If negotiations for unitization fail, 
the treaty implicitly allows both sides to continue production by only 
stipulating non-binding mediation.113 In contrast to standard 
international practice, the arbitration clause says nothing about 
consent to arbitrate or the finality of the decision.114 Standard 
international practice as used in the Iceland-Norway treaty and the 
Timor Gap treaty is to explicitly state that disputes “shall be 
submitted” to arbitration; that any award “shall be final and binding;” 
and how arbitrators are chosen.115  
Because the parties have not agreed that the arbitration will be 
binding, either party could refuse to comply with an arbitrator’s 
decision. Curiously, if the Joint Commission cannot agree to 
mediation and expert determination, then the arbitration will be 
conducted according to rules established by the Joint Commission.116 
Thus, the parties already in disagreement will have to establish the 
rules for resolving their disagreement while frustrated by the 
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disagreement. This dispute resolution clause could lead to competitive 
drilling by explicitly allowing a licensee to produce oil in the event 
negotiations fail.117 As discussed, competitive drilling in the face of a 
dispute would likely conflict with international law.118 
Arbitration could also be subject to legal challenge in both countries 
and fail even if the treaty followed standard practice for international 
transboundary treaties by specifying binding arbitration.119 In 2008, 
the United States Supreme Court decided in Medellin v. Texas that 
international treaties may be binding law for the federal government 
but not enforceable in United States courts if Congress did not pass 
“implementing legislation” to make ICJ decisions binding domestic 
law.120 In Medellin, the United States lost a case at the ICJ against 
Mexico for not informing Mexican nationals sentenced to death of 
their right to contact a consulate under the Vienna treaty.121 The Court 
declared Article 36 of the Vienna treaty not self-executing and said for 
decisions from international arbitrators or tribunals to be effective, 
Congress had to pass implementing legislation that explicitly stated 
that decisions constitute binding domestic law.122 In light of constant 
congressional gridlock, this is highly unlikely to happen.  
Additionally, when the 2012 treaty was ratified, Mexico was 
exempted from North American Free Trade Act (“NAFTA”) chapter 
11, dealing with energy and international investment arbitration as the 
legal regime barred foreign investment at the time.123 After Mexico’s 
energy reforms  it was unclear whether Mexico implicitly consented 
to oil and gas disputes to NAFTA chapter 11 and Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”).124 NAFTA’s replacement treaty125 
removes most ISDS mechanisms, with the exception of certain oil and 
gas disputes between Mexico and the United States.126 Oil companies 
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lobbied for ISDS due to fear the Mexican Government would attempt 
to nationalize the oil industry.127 ISDS for Oil and Gas against Mexico 
generally does not allow claims regarding minimum standard of 
treatment, indirect expropriation, or acquisition claims, and requires 
exhaustion of local remedies, making a dispute unlikely to reach the 
arbitrators.128 In reality, the new provisions for Oil and Gas dispute 
resolutions reflect the broader trend of international law moving away 
from international bodies in favor of States acting in more direct 
national interest.129 Thus, even if the language in the treaty conformed 
to standard international practice, a dispute against the United States 
is subject to challenge under Medellin and faces an uncertain ISDS 
regime against Mexico. Because the dispute resolution mechanism is 
so uncertain, it is necessary to ensure the Joint Commission can make 
decisions that neither side is likely to reject. 
The Joint Commission’s structure in the treaty is not especially 
robust.130 The Commission is made up of a representative from each 
party but depends on the respective executive authorities for 
funding.131 As the treaty grants the Joint Commission broad authority 
to interpret and implement the treaty as they unitize a transboundary 
reservoir, it needs more impartiality to reach agreements.132  
One option would be to strengthen the Joint Commission by 
structuring it more like the International Boundary Water Commission 
(“IBWC”). 133 The Joint Commission’s structure is in stark contrast to 
the IBWC, which operates as a bilateral international organization 
with clear qualifications for its members. The IBWC is divided into 
Executive, Operations, Engineering,  and Administration departments, 
while operating as independent and impartially as possible.134 The 
IBWC began in 1889 to oversee transboundary groundwater resources 
between the United States and Mexico according to rules agreed on in 
the 1884 convention.135 As an entity dealing with treaty 
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implementation over fugitive transboundary resources between the 
United States and Mexico for over a century, though it deals in a 
different field of law, some of the institutional knowledge gained from 
the IBWC could empower the Joint Commission in its mission.  
The Joint Commission can be strengthened by the two executive 
representatives making appointments to subsidiary committees like 
the IBWC departments, which would craft the necessary procedure 
and policy. Generally, the Joint Commission could give deference to 
committee decisions because of their expertise but the Joint 
Commission would retain veto power via their power granted in the 
treaty. State sovereignty would be preserved because the Joint 
Commission would ultimately ratify a committee decision for it to 
become binding, but the committees would be better at creating the 
policies than the Joint Commission. 
Some of the knowledge the IBWC has of dealing with a fugitive 
resource across borders is not relevant because the law treats water 
differently than minerals like hydrocarbons.136 Thus, rather than 
merely borrowing members from the IBWC, respective executive 
agencies need to pick some committee members with expertise in the 
international oil and gas industry. To balance the industry concerns, 
members should also be impartial, as both governments want the 
resources shared equitably. The IBWC has a history of equitably and 
successfully negotiating the sharing of fugitive resources between 
Mexico and the United States.137  
Though the IWBC lacks hydrocarbon industry expertise, its 
analogous expertise merits its involvement. Because the treaty leaves 
so much up to the Joint Commission to decide, the Joint Commission 
would be more effective and independent if the subsidiary committees 
are drawn from entities like the IWBC, arbitrators, and international 
law experts.138 According to the treaty, no committee decision could 
become law until the Joint Commission approves it. This delegation 
of authority makes their decisions less politicized, while the expertise 
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involved makes it more likely good and equitable decisions are 
reached, making it less likely parties to the unitization agreement opt 
for arbitration at all.  
Ideally, such a unitization agreement should be similar to a 
production-sharing agreement.139 However, production-sharing 
contracts work because the parties negotiate the terms before 
production begins. Though production-sharing agreements typically 
have set times to re-adjust the terms as more accurate seismic data is 
uncovered, the dynamics do not apply quite the same way in 
unitization. For an IOC that has spent ten years and several hundred 
million dollars establishing an ultra-deepwater well, the political risk 
of drilling close to maritime borders with a disputed legal framework 
may deter investment. If IOCs thought that exploration too close to the 
border could potentially result in an unfair production sharing 
agreement being forced on them after beginning production, it could 
potentially halt exploration in the area because the risk is too great.  
Ultimately, it is in the interest of both nations to formalize 
cooperation mechanisms so that common safety, infrastructure, and 
environmental standards can develop as licensees discover more 
offshore oil fields in the GOM.140 This goal is related to the United 
States’ greater geopolitical concerns of keeping Mexico’s energy 
reform alive by bringing stability so that IOCs can invest in the 
country, and PEMEX can gain expertise and technology by working 
with them. Though Mexican stability is a key concern, the United 
States also sees domestic offshore oil production as a benefit for 
energy security and thus wants to encourage investment in the 
region.141 In recent years, developed nations have opted to move away 
from international bodies in legal adjudication in favor of national 
discretion.142 A state that submits itself to an international body cedes 
some amount of sovereignty, and economic powerhouses like the 
United States are inevitably less likely to concede to international 
bodies. Strengthening the Joint Commission by creating specialized 
committees to create unitization policies and fill in the gaps for the 
Joint Commission to approve provides the best chance that the treaty 
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succeeds by minimizing the risk of dispute resolution derailing the 
negotiations. 
B. AMLO, USMCA, & Geopolitics 
The Mexican administration, which pushed through the liberalizing 
constitutional reforms in the energy sector, hoped that incorporating 
the reforms into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) would make 
Mexico’s energy sector permanently open to foreign investment.143 
The election of Donald Trump meant that the United States would not 
join the TPP, which weakened Mexico’s plan, but another election has 
jeopardized the reforms.144 The 2018 election of Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador (“AMLO”) will likely complicate implementing the 
2012 treaty and could potentially turn a dispute in the boundary area 
into international contention. AMLO, a staunch opponent of the 2014 
reforms who the media has dubbed as the “Mexican, left-wing Donald 
Trump,” has vowed to undo the privatization of Mexico’s hydrocarbon 
industry.145 AMLO is no friend to industry investors and in 1992, even 
led environmental protests against PEMEX.146 Because of the 
ambiguity of the treaty, and the politicization of transboundary 
reservoirs in Mexican politics, AMLO could conceivably claim the 
United States has violated the terms of the treaty, causing an 
international incident.147  
The AMLO administration quickly showed a willingness to adhere 
to radical campaign promises by halting construction of a partially-
constructed $13 billion airport.148 In a shock to hydrocarbon investors, 
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before his inauguration, his administration announced they would 
review all exploration and production contracts awarded to private 
companies after the energy reforms “for signs of corruption.”149 About 
two weeks later, AMLO called the executives of companies awarded 
contracts and informed them Mexico would honor their contracts if 
the oil companies could “meet existing terms” and indicated his 
administration would address regulatory bottlenecks but would still 
review the contracts.150 A month later, AMLO announced he would 
suspend future planned bidding rounds until the 107 awarded contracts 
started producing oil.151  
AMLO then somewhat ominously told investors, “we expect 
results” and unveiled an ambitious goal of increasing Mexico’s oil 
output and investing $3.9 billion in PEMEX’s exploration and 
production.152 He subsequently offered a three-year “truce” to 
companies who previously won bidding rounds.153 This was in his first 
few months in office, and the administration is also fulfilling AMLO’s 
vow to fight fuel theft by shutting down key pipelines and reducing 
United States oil imports.154 These early events show that AMLO may 
not follow through with his rhetoric but is willing to make decisions 
that are not economically viable because of his commitment to 
Mexico’s sovereignty over hydrocarbon resources, and what he feels 
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is best for his people. AMLO could potentially complicate a 
transboundary negotiation by public rhetoric alone. 
Before his election, some scholars hoped that the NAFTA 
renegotiations would help president Peña Nieto’s energy reforms 
apply more permanently.155 The Trump Administration’s 
renegotiation of NAFTA (United States, Mexico, and Canada 
Agreement “USMCA”) complicates the energy relations between 
Mexico and the United States. When the United States and Mexico 
drafted the 2012 treaty, Mexico had reservations from NAFTA’s 
dispute resolution chapter regarding oil and gas to preserve the 
PEMEX monopoly.156 USMCA was signed into law by President 
Trump on January 29, 2020.157 Under USMCA, Mexico’s oil and gas 
sector is subject to ISDS for disputes against the United States in 
limited situations, excluding indirect expropriation, establishment and 
acquisition claims, and only after local remedies are exhausted.158 
The 2012 treaty does not eliminate either party’s rights in other 
treaties.159 Thus, USMCA’s dispute resolution provisions apply to a 
confirmed transboundary reservoir in the treaty region.160 The 
governmental actions over a transboundary reservoir within the scope 
of USMCA’s dispute resolutions are limited, to the chagrin of 
investors.161 Contracts Mexico awards to foreign investors can only be 
submitted to ISDS for direct expropriation, violation of national 
treatment, and violation of the Most Favored Nation provision, and 
only after local remedies are exhausted.162 Additionally, national 
treatment claims regarding establishment or acquisition of an 
investment are expressly excluded.163 These sectorial limits to ISDS 
against Mexico were criticized by experts who were otherwise pleased 
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with USMCA for failing to support the United States’ energy interests 
sufficiently.164 Because the 2012 treaty does not eliminate any 
USMCA rules, the non-binding arbitration provided in the 2012 treaty 
remains an additional remedy for a dispute in the transboundary 
region. Arbitration under the 2012 treaty may now be more likely to 
be utilized in the event of a dispute because the options under USMCA 
are so limited, but its application is also likely to be contested. 
USMCA adds an annex to the investor arbitration provision that 
adds a specific structure to disputes in the energy sector because of the 
presence of PEMEX.165 Annex 14-E creates a neutral forum for 
licensees to resolve disputes about transactions that a unitization 
agreement may fall under, but investors receive less protection from 
expropriation.166 Generally, USMCA provides investors less 
protection than NAFTA, but USMCA makes it more evident than 
NAFTA that investors in the energy sector can have remedies under 
the treaty.167 These challenges posed by USMCA’s dispute resolution 
provisions make it even more important that the Joint Commission has 
enough expertise that it can anticipate and prevent any disputes before 
triggering a dispute resolution procedure. 
The infamous “Sunset Clause” in USMCA adds to the uncertainty 
investors in the transboundary region face.168 The Sunset Clause was 
hotly contested, criticized, and praised during the USMCA 
negotiations.169 The Sunset Clause provides that USMCA will 
terminate 16 years after entry, but every six years a commission will 
review USMCA for potential changes, and must affirm each party’s 
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desire to extend USMCA for another 16 years, or USMCA will 
terminate upon expiration of the 16 year term.170 Interestingly, 
USMCA also allows a party to withdraw as long as they provide a 6 
month notice, adding to the uncertainty.171 The Industry Trade 
Advisory Committee on Energy and Energy Services opposed the 
clause specifically because it could harm the energy sector’s 
necessarily long-term investments.172 As offshore oil and gas projects 
operate on a long timeline, USMCA could potentially go out of effect 
by failing to be re-approved between an IOC winning a lease and 
going into production. This would leave the dispute resolution regime 
totally uncertain, and clearly deters IOC investment in the 
transboundary region specifically, and in Mexico generally. 
USMCA specifies Mexico’s sovereign ownership of hydrocarbons 
in a stand-alone chapter titled, “The Mexican State’s Direct, 
Inalienable, and Imprescriptible Ownership of Hydrocarbons.”173 It 
also specifies that Mexico has a right to reform its domestic law, even 
though the point has never been disputed.174 The chapter specifies the 
Mexican state’s ownership of all hydrocarbons in the continental shelf 
and EEZ “in strata or deposits, regardless of their physical 
conditions.”175 This statement does not state anything new about 
Mexico’s hydrocarbon law or state anything inconsistent with 
international law. Although chapter 8 uses more forceful language, it 
essentially restates what the United States and Mexico acknowledged 
in the 2012 treaty. 
Because AMLO’s administration unlikely has the capacity to roll 
back Mexico’s energy reforms as promised, chapter 8 of USMCA 
seems mostly symbolic. AMLO’s administration can halt the bidding 
process and renegotiate a few contracts, or if he finds it politically 
expedient, he can allow all private contracts already negotiated to 
remain. Keeping the existing contracts and not allowing any more 
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would have the benefit of allowing PEMEX to gain expertise, an 
expanding market, and exploration data from the existing contracts 
while appearing to roll back reforms by merely halting any new 
contracts. The downside is this will slow the development of the 
Mexican energy sector because they will not have as much IOC 
investment. The concerns in both the United States and Mexico reflect 
how China’s trade practices have made national security a larger 
concern in all trade agreements, with the result of undermining 
international accountability to global bodies.176  
USMCA also seems to have been written with an eye to limit 
Chinese economic ties with North America by giving each nation veto 
power over free-trade deals.177 In the context of the Trump 
administration’s “trade war” with China, some experts have claimed 
that USMCA strengthened the United States’ position negotiating 
tariffs with China.178 AMLO’s administration is leveraging the 
tensions between the United States and China by calling for a 
“Marshall Plan” investment in Central America—and threatening to 
get help from Chinese investors if the United States is not on board.179 
The United States is clearly concerned about growing Chinese 
influence because their state-directed economy has been able to 
disrupt global trade flows in their favor.180 USMCA Article 32.10 
requires any party to the treaty negotiating with a non-market 
economy (such as China) to notify the other parties of their 
relationship, provide the parties the opportunity to review any 
agreements they reach, keep them generally informed, and determine 
if USMCA will apply to the country with a non-market economy.181 
This provision is unlikely to prevent Mexico from doing business with 
Chinese enterprises, but signals that the United States will scrutinize 
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any agreement and potentially leverage its position if it sees an 
operation as a threat.182 
Additionally, CNOOC—owned by the Chinese government—has 
spent recent years investing in offshore oil blocks on both sides of the 
GOM.183 Experts believe that CNOOC is investing on both sides of 
the transboundary region so that it can apply the same principles it 
learns during unitization negotiations to offshore resources in 
contested regions of the South China Sea.184 The Chinese government 
will also likely apply what it learns during the unitization negotiations 
as another tool in consolidating its Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”) to 
integrate Eurasian economies under a Chinese-led anti-democratic 
economic system.185 A defining feature of the BRI is maximizing 
flexibility in international law and treaties to favor Chinese 
ventures.186 The 2012 treaty, because of it’s vague terms, provides a 
key learning opportunity for the application of flexibility in 
international law. Thus, the implications of any decisions the Joint 
Commission comes to will have considerable influence in coming 
geopolitical realignments as power projection supplants the regime of 
international legal bodies established in the 20th century. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The 2012 transboundary treaty was negotiated with a different legal 
regime and geopolitical framework in mind. Mexico’s state-owned 
venture, PEMEX, was in severe crisis, but free trade agreements like 
the TPP promised to solve some of its problems while maintaining the 
national monopoly. Though leaders of both countries foresaw 
Mexico’s energy sector liberalizing, the treaty was designed for a time 
when there was no IOC exploration in Mexico. Thus, some of the 
treaty’s shortcomings are due to changed circumstances. Going 
forward, policymakers must consider a legal framework that creates 
stability so that the rich subsoil hydrocarbons of the GOM are 
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developed efficiently and equitably. This consideration is more vital 
considering that great power competition is leading States to move 
away from the oversight of international bodies out of national security 
concerns. 
Ultimately, the treaty’s shortcomings would be minimized by an 
effort to make the Joint Commission more experienced and thus better 
equipped to negotiate a unitization agreement. Subsidiary committees 
like the IWBC departments, comprised of members with expertise in 
maritime boundary disputes, would strengthen the Joint Commission. 
The Joint Commission can use its existing treaty powers to appoint one 
or several subsidiary committees to create unitization policy, dispute 
resolution procedure, set environmental standards, and interpret 
seismic data. The Joint Commission can increase the expertise and 
impartiality of the committees by appointing experts in international 
oil and gas arbitration who have excellent industry knowledge; IBWC 
members; and respected experts in international law. Expert 
committees could alleviate the vague environmental and safety 
standards by creating something more concrete for the Joint 
Commission to implement that benefits all parties. The committees 
could also lessen the effect of the treaty’s unclear dispute resolution 
clause, while avoiding a lengthy treaty amendment or renegotiation. 
Because no committee policy is binding without the Joint 
Commission’s approval, the two Joint Commission members would 
have a veto that maintains state sovereignty but is more likely to 
produce effective policies. 
Both the United States and Mexico desire to develop offshore oil as 
safely and efficiently as possible. The 2012 treaty left open the 
possibility that a light Rule of Capture could be applied if unitization 
negotiations failed, even though this would likely be contrary to 
international law. Though not directly in conflict, the interests of the 
United States, Mexico, and potential IOC licensees are not aligned, so 
great care is needed to craft a unitization agreement. While allowing a 
licensee to continue production by putting profits in escrow may be the 
best option, it may not benefit investors who lose opportunity costs and 
cash flow while the profit remains in escrow. Because of Medellin and 
Mexico’s USMCA’s limited ISDS provisions, investor disputes could 
be subject to legal challenges in both countries. USMCA’s sunset 
provision creates more uncertainty for investors. If the Joint 
Commission has the resources to make the best decisions, it will 
prevent disputes from arising and entering this arena of legal 
uncertainty surrounding the dispute resolution provisions.  
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Most importantly, the Joint Commission delegating its authority to 
committees can depoliticize much of the decision-making process 
without undermining executive prerogatives in the treaty. As the world 
goes through geopolitical realignment and global financial difficulty, 
Chinese NOC investment in Mexico’s offshore oil may provoke a less 
equitable United States reaction during negotiations. Frosty relations 
between the United States and China may mean that geopolitical 
concerns take precedence over economic and energy security concerns. 
The way the United States and Mexico apply the 2012 treaty will have 
a direct effect in contested areas around the world, like the South China 
Sea. Thus, it is imperative that the United States and Mexico behave as 
good neighbors so they can exploit ocean resources that until recently 
were considered the property of all humanity by virtue of natural law. 
 
